Some excerpts from the longish decision Friday by Judge Benjamin Beaton (E.D. Ky.) in Woodcock v. Capilouto:
This opinion addresses the latest chapter in the ongoing saga concerning Professor Ramsi Woodcock, his commentary regarding Israel and Palestine, and the University of Kentucky’s investigation into whether he violated Title VI or the school’s technology or conduct policies….
Earlier this month, this Court denied law professor Ramsi Woodcock’s request to halt the University of Kentucky’s ongoing investigation into several comments he made related to his views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and his 2025 “Petition for Military Action Against Israel.” Woodcock’s initial submissions had not persuasively shown that the investigation was retaliatory in its origin or chilling in its ongoing effect.
But the order set an evidentiary hearing two weeks later to address these fact-dependent questions and Woodcock’s request for a preliminary injunction. The investigation—which had lasted more than a year and whose report was already overdue—could not “last forever” without threatening Woodcock’s First Amendment rights. And the University of Kentucky’s corresponding “reassignment” of Woodcock from teaching duties throughout the investigation was increasingly hard to justify, particularly given the absence of any articulated suspicion of classroom disruption….
Then, one week after the TRO decision, the outside investigator’s 134-page sealed (for now) report finally landed. {That report is provisionally under seal pending the resolution of a motion to seal, which will be referred to a Magistrate Judge.} …
[Now], the Dean of the law school could decide whether to lift Woodcock’s reassignment from teaching and restore him to the classroom for the spring semester. This could happen as late as mid-December, according to counsel, without prejudicing Woodcock’s ability to teach…. [And] the University President could decide, based on the investigative report, whether (in his view) Woodcock violated any laws or policies….
The court had this to say about Woodcock’s request for a temporary injunction to block any findings by the University President:
During previous hearings, this Court observed that Woodcock’s effort to end his reassignment from teaching stood on firmer ground that his request to halt the investigation itself. That view rested largely on caselaw that contemplated speech-related investigations consistent with the First Amendment yet considered whether any attendant consequences of such investigations abridged those rights based on a retaliatory purpose, chilled speech, or both. {See generally, e.g., Sensabaugh v. Halliburton (6th Cir. 2019) (no adverse action based on “letter of guidance” and reprimand in the context of a “independent law firm” investigation involving “scores of documents and text messages” and “seventeen different witnesses”); Moore v. Garnand (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e never held that a retaliatory investigation alone could violate the First Amendment, as our holding rested on much more than just a retaliatory investigation[.]”).} …
Woodcock insists that the First Amendment bars the President from spending “weeks poring over documents” unrelated to “any arguable policy violation.” “Whatever the University decides about spring teaching, findings issued on the investigator’s report would injure Woodcock irreparably on their own.” To the extent that review entails an inquiry into his political beliefs, Woodcock contends, the process is illegitimate and should be enjoined immediately….
[But] a substantial body of caselaw indicates that a speech-related investigation alone generally doesn’t amount to retaliation or adverse action. {See, e.g., Churchill v. Univ. of Colorado at Boulder (Colo. App. 2010) (“Courts have concluded that investigations alone are not adverse employment actions.”); Sensabaugh (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding no adverse action even when context included a “painstakin[g] investigation”); Couch v. Board. of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Carbon County (10th Cir. 2009) (investigation didn’t amount to adverse action supporting First Amendment retaliation); Benningfield v. City of Houston (5th Cir. 1998) (“Although a reprimand can constitute an adverse employment action, an investigation does not[.]”); Moore (“[W]e have never held that a retaliatory investigation alone could violate the First Amendment”); Bell v. Sheriff of Broward County 1375 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[D]eputy Bell’s five-day suspension with pay pending an investigation into his conduct is not an adverse action.”). But as emphasized in the Court’s previous TRO opinion, the caselaw in this area is hardly uniform and uncertainty remains about how different circuits might approach each specific factual scenario. See, e.g., Holt v. Pennsylvania (3d Cir. 2017) (“Our Circuit has not considered whether the initiation of an internal investigation can constitute an ‘adverse action’ for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim, and our sister circuits are split on the issue.”).} The collateral consequences of an investigation, by contrast, may create an intolerable chill that could warrant judicial intervention. See, e.g., Levin v. Harleston (2d Cir. 1992); White v. Lee (9th Cir. 2000). The First Amendment leaves at least some room for employers to investigate their employees for perceived misconduct, even when the alleged offenses relate to speech. Waters v. Churchill (1994) (plurality op.) (“Only [investigative] procedures outside the range” of reasonableness violate First Amendment despite investigation’s “risk of erroneously punishing protected speech.”); Gartenberg v. Cooper Union (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (even protected speech may be relevant to determining “whether actionable harassment occurred”).
Woodcock hasn’t pointed to any precedent halting a school’s investigation based only on its existence or the “brand” or “reputational harm” that it might produce. To the contrary, the two precedents on which he relies most heavily are easily distinguishable.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), is a 70-year-old precedent concerning a state attorney general’s investigation into a professor’s affiliation with the Communist and Progressive Parties. It had little, if anything, to say about the operations, autonomy, or academic interests of a university. Contra, e.g., Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985).
Fischer v. Thomas (6th Cir. 2022), likewise sits far afield from the context of university governance and academic speech. In that pre-enforcement challenge, the Sixth Circuit barred a state judicial commission from initiating formal proceedings against two judicial candidates after it “sen[t] vague and threatening letter to [the] candidates on the eve of election.” The opinion didn’t address whether an investigation or its concluding findings amounted to adverse action or retaliation….
Fifth, even assuming Woodcock could establish a likelihood of success on the merits of his retaliation claim, to obtain a TRO he’d have to show irreparable harm and the balance of the equities relative to third parties and the public. Irreparable harm likely requires at least some showing of subjective chill as well; otherwise a court would be left to wonder why and “whether it needs to act now.” …
The current record does precious little to “identify speech that [Woodcock] wishes to make in the future but for the threat of prosecution of that future speech.” Despite boilerplate assertions that he’d otherwise say and write more about Israel and Palestine, it’s hardly clear that this investigation has chilled Woodcock’s speech at all. He points to a paper called “A Law and Economics Argument for Ending Israel” that he hasn’t yet submitted to the law reviews; diminished posting on his blog, called “the Antizionist Legal Studies Movement;” and allegedly decreased Twitter activity. Yet Woodcock’s social-media and listserv posting hasn’t stopped altogether; during this investigation he has continued to post on X and the AALS online discussion groups, including about Israel; he has filed at least four lawsuits, several of which have been covered in the press; he maintains a webpage supplying information about and soliciting support for his speech and litigation. Without further evidence, the Court cannot conclude that Woodcock will be chilled over the next two weeks.
Although the general tendency in the caselaw to treat First Amendment violations as irreparable harm cautions against assigning dispositive weight to this factor, the weakness of Woodcock’s showing on the current record at least cuts against automatic or presumptive injunctive relief to ameliorate any purported self-censorship….
The court also pointed to the university’s own interest in speaking about Woodcock’s speech:
[A]n injunction barring the President from reacting to the investigator’s findings would—even on Woodcock’s own terms—remedy one arguable free-speech violation with another. As any law professor knows, Justice Brandeis taught that the “remedy” for disfavored speech should ordinarily be more speech—not additional suppression. A college president, just like a law professor, may presumptively speak—privately or publicly—about a matter of public and professional interest such as this. Indeed, both have done so during this process.
And President Capiluto’s own speech rights aren’t the only countervailing interests at issue. The University has its own governance interests in the orderly and prompt resolution of a high-profile pending investigation. See Ewing (“Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, … but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself.”). “Without this ability to investigate, a public employer would be left without recourse and would lose its ‘greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees.'”
Given these compounding considerations, the Court concluded that no temporary order revisiting the Court’s prior orders and specifically restraining the President was warranted based on these allegations of objective chill (regarding Woodcock’s likelihood of success on the merits), subjective chill (regarding any irreparable harm associated with Woodcock’s speech pending the forthcoming presidential findings), or the public and third-party interest in an orderly and prompt conclusion to an academic investigation….
This order, to be clear, does not resolve whether the University officials’ past actions constituted retaliation in violation of the First Amendment—a distinct and retrospective question, for which damages and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1988 are at least potentially available (though the Defendants of course disagree). While those historical facts are necessary to Woodcock’s showing of likelihood of success on the merits, even if proved they are not sufficient to warrant a restraining order, which requires a showing of ongoing chilled speech.
Nor does this order address the propriety of any discipline that Woodcock might eventually face. As described above, those questions haven’t ripened and follow their own administrative process—one the Sixth Circuit specifically contemplated might alter the abstention analysis….
There will still be a preliminary injunction hearing on Dec. 3, and for it the court orders extra briefing on the following “disputed factual issues”:
- The nature of Woodcock’s “interest in speaking on a matter of public concern” and the nature of the University’s “interest ‘in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees'” as a public professional school.
- The extent to which the ongoing investigation, any presidential findings, and any subsequent process might chill the speech of a professor of “ordinary firmness.”
- Any unusual or ancillary aspects of the investigation or its origin that may bear on retaliation under the First Amendment, including the basis for Woodcock’s campus ban and teaching reassignment.
- Any University policies or customs governing employee investigations and their applicability to this investigation and its collateral consequences.
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