Call it the Miliband doctrine. Let’s hope the new Israeli settlement boycott is just the start | Steve Bloomfield

Almost 30 years ago, the Labour titan Robin Cook announced his arrival at the Foreign Office by laying out what would become described as an “ethical foreign policy”. The UK, he said, “must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves”. Human rights would be “at the heart of our foreign policy”.

In the 25 years since Cook was demoted, Britain has had a further 14 foreign secretaries – including seven in the past six years – few of whom can claim to have placed progressive ideals at the heart of their actions. Ed Miliband’s speech on Tuesday outlining the UK’s decision to impose economic sanctions on Israeli settlements in the West Bank – and unveiling the international coalition he has built to support it – suggests that Cook may finally have a successor.

Describing what is happening in the West Bank as “ethnic cleansing” carried out by “settler terrorists”, Miliband used language that Palestinians have longed to hear from a British foreign secretary. Vital, too, was his official recognition that the occupation of the West Bank is “unlawful”.

Britain was not acting alone. Miliband and diplomats at the Foreign Office have carefully formed a 12-nation coalition, including France and Canada, that spoke with one voice. A cautious European Union, partly blocked by a handful of Benjamin Netanyahu allies, could not have taken such action; while US membership of the G7 – regardless of Donald Trump – would have always made that avenue impossible too.

The consequences of the sanctions for Israel could be profound, although much will depend on the implementation. The most far-reaching proposal announced by Miliband was the targeting of those who “finance … illegal settlements”. That could mean every single Israeli bank. For those banks it will pose a crucial question: do you want to do business with the settlements or the UK? It could pose a question for Israeli citizens too: do you want your credit card to work in the settlements or when you’re on holiday in London?

Ahead of elections at the end of next month there is growing awareness in Israel of the lack of western allies the country can now rely upon. Support is ebbing away in the US too. More Americans now sympathise with the Palestinians than the Israelis, while more than half now back a Palestinian state.

Even centrist Democrats are beginning to suggest the US position could change. In the wake of Miliband’s announcement, Hillary Clinton, the former secretary of state, on Thursday called for a “crackdown on settler violence” and said the US should “take a very tough position” if Netanyahu is re-elected.

Beyond Israel, the past few days have shown that Britain now has a government that understands that the world has changed since Trump’s re-election. Since the second world war, the US has been Britain’s most important diplomatic partner. For many of those in Whitehall, adjusting to the realisation that Washington is no longer the first phone call when trying to come up with a diplomatic solution has not been straightforward.

It is enormously promising that the Foreign Office could not only pull together a strong coalition but also lead it. This time the phone calls to Washington came at the end, once the policy had been agreed – Andy Burnham briefing Trump, and Miliband talking through the details with his secretary of state, Marco Rubio.

Alongside the E3 of Britain, France and Germany, which has taken the lead on forming a rival western policy on Ukraine, it is clear we’re moving into a new era of ad hoc diplomatic groups that may be just as effective as their more formal predecessors.

Traditional alliances, from the G7 to Nato, are falling apart – destroyed from the inside by a US president who is opposed to multilateralism, liberal democracy and the rule of law. For the first year of Trump’s second term in office, the “rest of the west” was inert: some leaders simply refused to believe that the US was no longer an ally, while others fully understood the challenge but hadn’t worked out how to meet it.

But since the start of 2026, the debate has been over, thanks to the publication of Trump’s incendiary national security strategy and his relentless desire to annex Greenland, threatening a Nato ally with invasion. As Mark Carney laid out in Davos, there has been a “rupture” in the international rules-based order and it is vital that the middle powers come together.

The big question for Burnham and Miliband is whether they can build on this start and turn Britain into a progressive international force. How they deal with three key issues will be indicative. The easiest – but most expensive – will be aid. Both have expressed a desire to reverse Keir Starmer’s 40% cut to the international aid and development budget, a decision that managed to be both immoral and self-defeating. If this can be done, the UK may regain some of the soft power it so carelessly threw away.

They will face a bigger challenge in Ukraine, where the E3-led “coalition of the willing” has so far had little impact on the only two men who count, Trump and the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. While the US president so far appears unwilling to waste any political capital in saving Netanyahu, he seems more disposed to come to the aid of his counterpart in Moscow.

Finally, there is another war that Miliband should be striving to end: the long-running conflict in Sudan. Just as with Israel, it will involve standing up to a close ally in the Middle East, in this case the United Arab Emirates (UAE). For the past few years, the UAE has been funding and arming the Rapid Support Forces, a militia group that now controls large swathes of the country and has been accused by a UN report of committing atrocities that bear the “hallmarks of genocide”.

The bravery that the government has displayed on Israel has been, so far, sadly missing on Sudan. The UK has consistently failed to criticise the UAE, merely urging nameless “external actors” to stop “supplying, funding and fuelling the war”. Another coalition of the willing exists here, too, the E4+, which includes France, Germany and Norway. But they need to move beyond statements expressing “deep concern” if anything is going to change.

These ad hoc alliances may not last. By next spring, Emmanuel Macron will no longer be in the Élysée palace, possibly replaced by a far-right president. Friedrich Merz is fighting for his political survival in Germany too, where again the biggest threat is a far-right party aligned with Trump. It is vital that Miliband makes use of these alliances while he can.

Placing values at the heart of foreign policy is fraught with political risk. Within days of Cook’s speech in May 1997, it emerged that the UK was planning to sell more Hawk jets to an Indonesian regime that was attacking its own civilians in East Timor. “Ethical foreign policy” became a joke, rather than a doctrine.

But it’s worth noting that Cook didn’t actually use the phrase he was credited with. Instead he said the UK’s foreign policy “must have an ethical dimension”, a caveat that showed an understanding that human rights cannot always trump realpolitik.

During his four years in office, that ethical dimension could be seen in the banning of landmines, an annual human rights report and the Nato-led military action to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Miliband, too, is no wide-eyed idealist. There were those who would have wanted him to go further – for instance, by declaring that there has been a genocide in Gaza. He has also come to the conclusion that however dangerous Trump is, the UK must be careful about how – and when – it stands up to him.

But the past few days have shown that foreign policy with an ethical dimension is not only possible, but can make a difference. There will be many people around the world, from Gaza to Darfur, who hope it continues.