No Pseudonymity in Lawsuit Against Apple for Allegedly Enabling Stalking Via AirTags—Other Courts Had Allowed Pseudonymity

As a reminder of just how badly split courts are on a wide range of questions related to the law of pseudonymous litigation, from Judge Kent Wetherell (N.D. Fla.) Wednesday in Doe v. Apple, Inc.:

This case is before the Court based on Plaintiff’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym. No response is needed. {Even if the motion is not opposed by Defendant (as it appears that it will not be), the Court is not required to grant it.}

Plaintiff has asserted multiple claims against Apple, Inc., related to its design, manufacture, and marketing of the Apple AirTag. The claims are based on a former paramour’s alleged use of an AirTag to stalk Plaintiff.

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed anonymously because the litigation will require the disclosure of intimate aspects of Plaintiff’s life (e.g., domestic violence, sexual harassment) related to the stalking. She is also concerned that requiring her to disclose her identity could enable her stalker to locate her, thereby creating a safety risk for her and her minor child.

“A party may proceed anonymously in federal court by establishing ‘a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.'” …

“[C]ourts have[, however,] often denied the protection of anonymity in cases where plaintiffs allege sexual assault, even when revealing the plaintiff’s identity may cause her to ‘suffer some personal embarrassment.'” … [T]he circumstances underlying the complaint have [also] apparently already been aired in a state restraining order proceeding….

Plaintiff’s speculative concern that identifying herself in this action will provide her stalker “a direct avenue … to confirm her location, continue his surveillance, and further interfere with her safety” can be addressed through a protective order or sealing of specific documents filed in this case. Indeed, courts have denied leave to proceed anonymously in the face of more substantial threats of harm. See, e.g., In re Chiquita Brands Int’l Inc. (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s refusal to grant anonymity even after paramilitaries “threatened and attacked a named bellwether plaintiff and her family four months after her deposition”).

[Moreover,] “[d]efendants have the right to know who their accusers are, as they may be subject to embarrassment or fundamental unfairness if they do not.” “[I]f the complaint’s allegations cannot be substantiated, ‘then anonymity provides a shield behind which defamatory charges may be launched without shame or liability’ and it will be [Defendant] (not Plaintiff) who faces disgrace.”

The Court did not overlook that another district court granted the plaintiff leave to proceed anonymously in a substantially similar suit. See Doe v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. (E.D. Pa. 2024). That decision is not binding and is not even persuasive because it was decided under the law of the Third Circuit, not the Eleventh Circuit. Additionally, in giving significant weight to the plaintiff’s “heightened fear for her personal safety if her stalker were to learn her home address or whereabouts,” the court apparently did not consider whether those concerns could be ameliorated by a protective order or sealing documents that contained that information.

The Court also recognizes that plaintiffs in other cases filed against Apple by AirTag stalking victims [in E.D. Va., D. Nev., E.D.N.Y., and D. Ariz] have been allowed to proceed anonymously, but those rulings were in text-only orders that did not contain any analysis. Also, those rulings were presumably not based on Eleventh Circuit law. {There also appear to be numerous other cases in which alleged AirTag stalking victims are not proceeding anonymously, as reflected on the docket of the failed class action against Apple.}