Parents’ Free Exercise Claim Against School for Referring to Student by “Preferred Name[] and Gender Pronoun[]” Can Go Forward

From Judge Paul Maloney (W.D. Mich.) in Mead v. Rockford Public School Dist.:

Dan and Jennifer Mead have a child, G.M., who attended a middle school in the Rockford Public School District. The Meads contend that the District had policies that encouraged school staff to refer to students by their preferred names and gender pronouns, even without parental knowledge or consent.

{Plaintiffs Dan and Jennifer Mead believe that everyone is born with a “fixed biological sex” as a “gift from God.” They believe that it is harmful to “refer[] to a child using pronouns that are inconsistent with that child’s biological sex” because those pronouns “communicate a message to and about the child that is untrue.” The Meads’ child [seventh-grader G.M.] is biologically female and, consistent with their religious beliefs, the Meads refer to their child as their daughter, using female pronouns and a female name.}

G.M. asked the school to refer to G.M. using a different name and gendered pronouns that did not match G.M.’s sex at birth. The school followed its policy and complied with G.M.’s request. The Meads discovered this situation, withdrew their child, and sued the District and the School Board. The Meads allege that these policies interfere with the free exercise of their religion, among other causes of action. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted in part in August 2025. The court dismissed the free exercise claim.

For more on the 2025 decision (which also did allow parents’ parental rights claim to go forward), see this post. Back to today’s decision:

In March 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta (2026) (per curiam), a case involving similar facts and a free exercise claim. Relying on Mirabelli, the Meads filed a motion for reconsideration. The court agrees that Mirabelli calls into question the court’s interpretation of the relevant law and will grant the motion to reconsider….

In its previous order, the court held that Defendants’ policies did not substantially interfere with the religious development of the Meads’ child for two reasons. First, the policies did not compel either the Meads or their child to do or to believe anything. The policies are internal guidelines for school staff. Second, the policies in this case are unlike policies that the Supreme Court did violate a parent’s free-exercise rights. The District’s disputed policies did not relate to attendance, did not compel action by the Meads, and did not involve instruction or school curriculum. The Court then held that the policies here were neutral, generally applicable, and passed rational-basis review, and so the Meads’ free-exercise claim was dismissed.

This court relied on the reasoning from a then recent unpublished decision issued by the Sixth Circuit, Doe No.1 v. Bethel Local School District Board of Education (6th Cir. 2025). In that case, parents sued a school district over its policy allowing a transgender student to use the communal restroom of their preferred gender. The panel held that the policy did not trigger strict scrutiny outright because, unlike the policy in Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025), the bathroom policy was neither a “curricular feature” nor did it require religious students to use communal restrooms. The school also had single-occupancy bathrooms available for anyone to use.

As mentioned above, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam, non-merits opinion in Mirabelli on March 2, 2026. Mirabelli involved school policies similar to the District’s policies here. When a student engaged in gender transitioning at school, the policy prevented school staff from telling the student’s parents about their child’s situation unless the student consented….

The Supreme Court found that the parent-plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits for the purpose of a stay pending appeal. The Court found that “California’s policies will likely not survive the strict scrutiny that Mahmoud demands.” In a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett wrote that the Ninth Circuit had “significantly misunderstood” Mahmoud by following the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Bethel.

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration asks the court to consider the weight of two non-binding opinions: (1) an unpublished opinion issued by the Sixth Circuit and (2) a non-merits interim opinion issued by the United State Supreme Court. “It is well-established law in this circuit that unpublished cases are not binding precedent.” The Sixth Circuit has offered some guidance regarding the use of its unpublished opinions. “Although our unpublished case law is valuable insofar as it is persuasive and correctly identified governing legal principles, when it fails to meet that standard” courts should “not hesitate” follow the correct law. Similarly, interim orders issued by the Supreme Court “are not conclusive on the merits” but do “inform how a court should exercise its equitable discretion in like cases.” Trump v. Boyle (2025).

Plaintiffs have established a sufficient reason for this court to reconsider its prior opinion. Likely this court made a error of law by relying on the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that Mahmoud was a narrow and limited decision focused on curricular decisions. At least three Justices have indicated that Mahmoud should not be so interpreted. In addition, the court notes that Mahmoud and Bethel resolved free expression challenges arising from facts different from the facts here. In contrast, Mirabelli arose from a challenge to a substantially similar school district policy. Accordingly, the court finds the reasoning in Mirabelli more applicable than the reasoning in Bethel and Mahmoud.

Like the policies at issue in Mirabelli, the policies here likely created a substantial burden on the Meads’ free-exercise rights. The Meads share religious beliefs similar to the parents in Mirabelli about the permanency of biological sex and the fixed relationship between sex and gender. At the time of the alleged violation, the Meads’ child was also around the same age (seventh and eighth grades) as one of the children in Mirabelli (eighth grade). And like the parents in Mirabelli, the Meads did not have an opportunity to opt their child out of Defendants’ policies.

Defendants’ policies therefore trigger strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, a government must demonstrate that its policy “advances interests of the highest order and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.” In Mirabelli, the Court held that the school’s policies would not likely satisfy either prong:

The State argues that its policies advance a compelling interest in student safety and privacy. But those policies cut out the primary protectors of children’s best interests: their parents. See Troxel v. Granville (2000) (plurality opinion). California’s policies also appear to fail the narrow-tailoring requirement. The State’s interest in safety could be served by a policy that allows religious exemptions while precluding gender-identity disclosure to parents who would engage in abuse.

Defendants do not give the court any reason to treat the policies here any differently. In their response, Defendants argue, once again, that the school’s discretion to notify parents (in light of its responsibility to keep them informed) is narrowly tailored to meet their interest in promoting student safety and success. But school discretion here is only as narrowly tailored as the policies in Mirabelli: the policies do not factor in parents’ views and, as a result, they “cut” parents out. So, in light of Mirabelli, the Meads have stated a claim for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause ….

John Bursch, Vincent Wagner, Noel Sterett, Dalton Nichols, David Cortman, and Katherine Anderson (Alliance Defending Freedom) represent plaintiffs.