“As If These Blunders Were Not Enough,” U.S. Attorney Office Management …

From Judge Beryl Howell’s long opinion last week in U.S. v. Thompson; read the full opinion for details (and see here for more on the Speedy Trial Act, which provides more specific time limits and procedures than does the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause):

The government’s pending motion to dismiss without prejudice the indictment against defendant Adrian Thompson amounts to nothing more than a strategic attempt to circumvent the Speedy Trial Act in circumstances where noncompliance with this statute was inevitable and due entirely to the government’s own mismanagement of this case.

After defendant was first arrested in 2024 and brought to the District of Columbia Superior Court, the charge against him was “no-papered,” or declined for prosecution, but then he was arrested a second time in 2025 and charged in this Court and scheduled to face a jury trial on July 20, 2026, on a one-count indictment alleging felon-in-possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Following a series of missteps by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (“USAO-DC”)—including double booking its line attorney for two trials scheduled to begin on the same day; knowing for over nine months about problems with an essential government witness but failing to make timely alternative plans; and ignoring defendant’s repeated requests for discovery and Brady materials—the government realized in the lead up to the trial date, which had been proposed by the parties and adopted by the court four months earlier, that it is not ready. After first attempting to seek a continuance of “at least 90 days,” which was denied on Speedy Trial Act grounds, the government is now requesting dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a).

The missteps leading to the current posture of this case may be laid squarely at the feet of management at the USAO-DC. How else to explain double-booking the same Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA-1”) for two jury trials on the same day in this Court, without substituting in another line attorney for one of the trials? How else to explain that the assigned AUSA-1 needed supervisory permission to call the essential law enforcement witness necessary for the introduction of DNA evidence tying defendant to the gun at issue in the charge, yet was not alerted of that requirement by his supervisors until less than a month before trial?

How else to explain that when supervisors were consulted by another AUSA (“AUSA-2”) about the witness problem in mid-June 2026, efforts to re-do the DNA testing by collecting new buccal swabs from defendant did not occur until almost four weeks later at the pretrial conference held ten days before the scheduled trial date? How else to explain the recurring problems involving the same essential government witness in USAO-DC cases, including a prior case in this Court where the same issue also surfaced just before trial?

The present predicament boils down to this: The government cannot proceed to trial due to its own dilatory behavior and so grasps at Rule 48(a) to end-run the Court’s denial of its continuance motion. The government has informed the Court that, after dismissal, it will be ready to re-prosecute “in approximately 90 days” at which time “this case can proceed to adjudication.” Unsurprisingly, defendant, who has met nearly every court-imposed deadline, been under stringent pretrial supervision for over a year, and diligently prepared for months in reliance on the parties’ jointly proposed July 2026 trial date, vigorously opposes the government’s motion and requests instead dismissal with prejudice.

For the reasons set forth below, the government’s motion for without-prejudice dismissal is granted in part insofar as the motion seeks dismissal of the indictment, and denied in part as to its request that the dismissal be without prejudice. Accordingly, the indictment against defendant is dismissed with prejudice….