Some excerpts from the long opinion by Judge Thomas Thrash (N.D. Ga.) yesterday in Winer v. Mohammad:
This action arises out of alleged defamatory statements that Defendant Umaymah Mohammad, a student at the Emory University School of Medicine, made about Plaintiff Joshua Winer, a physician and professor at Emory. Mohammad, who is Palestinian, sent an email to the entire School of Medicine student and faculty body on January 17, 2024, in which the Plaintiff alleges she “praised terrorism against Israel, expressed her hatred towards Israel and the United States, and stated that Israel, the United States, and Emory are perpetrating a genocide against Palestinians in Gaza.”
Nearly two months later, in March 2024, the Plaintiff published an op-ed piece in an Israeli news publication sharing his decision to travel to Israel to volunteer as a physician in the Israeli Defense Force (“IDF”) following the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel. The Plaintiff identifies as Jewish and maintains dual American and Israeli citizenship. He is a surgical oncologist at Emory Winship Cancer Institute, a professor in the Department of Surgery, Division of Surgical Oncology at the School of Medicine, and serves as the School of Medicine Surgical Clerkship Director.
In April 2024, Mohammad participated in an interview for a news organization called Democracy Now!. In the interview, Mohammad was asked about the email she sent and was asked to explain the importance of the issue to her. As part of her response, Mohammad referenced Winer by stating that
one of the professors of medicine we have at Emory recently went to serve as a volunteer medic in the Israeli Offense Force [sic] and recently came back. This man participated in aiding and abetting a genocide, in aiding and abetting the destruction of the healthcare system in Gaza and the murder of over 400 healthcare workers, and is now back at Emory so-called teaching medical students and residents how to take care of patients.
Mohammad was ultimately suspended from the School of Medicine for one year based on her comments in the Democracy Now! interview. In November 2024, Mohammad participated in a podcast hosted by the International Union of Scientists in which she made similar statements about the Plaintiff. In January 2025, she made more statements about the Plaintiff’s IDF service in the online publication Mondoweiss. In the Mondoweiss piece, Mohammad claimed that the Plaintiff “believe[d] in the legitimacy of apartheid, and that some human lives are not as important as others.”
At the end of the piece, she provided a link to a social media post by Defendants National Students for Justice in Palestine (“NSJP”) and Doctors Against Genocide (“DAG”), which ultimately led to a campaign on the website of Action Network that “contained additional false statements about Plaintiff and identified him by name.” NSJP and DAG also published posts on Instagram regarding the Action Network campaign, which directly quoted Mohammad’s Democracy Now! interview. These Defendants made a second Instagram post a few weeks later. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant WESPAC is NSJP’s fiscal sponsor and, therefore, “knowingly funded and facilitated NSJP’s coordinated efforts to vilify Plaintiff and pressure Emory to discipline [him].”
In February 2025, Defendant CAIR Georgia held a press conference on the subject of Mohammad’s suspension, during which she made the following statement:
[Emory] disciplined me for exposing Emory’s complicity in the destruction of Gaza in an interview where I mentioned an unnamed physician who served in the military, actively engaged in the genocidal campaign against the Palestinian people, my people … I cannot learn from a physician who might have fired one of the 355 bullets that landed in 6 year old Hind Rajab’s body. Or who might have helped make the decision to bomb one of the hospitals in Gaza. Or who might have celebrated the murder of our communities on the rubble still wet with Palestinian blood. A doctor who cannot see Palestinians as human beings will return to Atlanta to offer the same disposability to black and brown patients at home.
CAIR Georgia, along with CAIR Foundation Inc. (“CAIR Foundation”), also issued a press release with a link to Mohammad’s Democracy Now! interview and rebroadcasted this speech on its Instagram account on February 11, 2025. In this post, (the “IG Post”), CAIR Georgia also replied to comments by providing a link to a previously circulated email template and phone script that identified the Plaintiff by name and called for Emory to investigate him and/or terminate his employment.
Mohammad’s statements were later broadcasted and published by television stations and news outlets. Defendant Ibrahim Jouja was the President of Emory SJP when it shared NSJP and DAG’s posts on the Emory SJP Instagram account, and also made or collaborated on similar posts sharing the Democracy Now! interview and identifying the Plaintiff “as a physician with military combat experience against Palestinians.” Defendant Rupa Marya works with Mohammad as a cofounder of DAG and, the Plaintiff alleges, she has “frequently identified Plaintiff by name and used her social media platforms to spread harmful and reputationally damaging statements about him,” including blaming him for the termination of a Palestinian professor at Emory School of Medicine and accusing him of participating in a genocide….
The court allowed plaintiff’s federal claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1985) to go forward:
Section 1985(3) “created a cause of action against private individuals who, among other things, undertake conspiracies for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” “That § 1985(3) reaches private action does not, however, mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others.” …
The Plaintiff hinges [the remaining part of] his § 1985(3) claim on the alleged violations of his rights under … Title VI. The Eleventh Circuit does not appear to have addressed whether a violation of Title VI is enforceable against a private conspirator under § 1985(3), so for the reasons the Court expressed in its prior orders, the Court presumes that it is. To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must establish that the defendant has
(1) conspired or gone in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) taken or caused an action to be taken in furtherance of the conspiracy’s object, and (4) injured an individual’s person or property or deprived her of exercising any right or privilege of a United States citizen.
Title VI provides that no one shall “be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” on the ground of his “race, color, or national origin.” To state a claim under § 2000d, a plaintiff must only allege that the defendant receives federal funds, that it discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of race, color, or national origin, and that it did so in the course of a federally funded program….
[Plaintiff asserts] a § 1985(3) claim based on a conspiracy to induce Emory to violate his Title VI rights. And for purposes of a motion to a dismiss, he has stated such a claim as to the CAIR Foundation theory. The Plaintiff alleges that CAIR Foundation receives federal funding, making § 2000d enforceable against it. More specifically, he alleges that CAIR Foundation received federal funding, that it conspired with the other defendants, including Mohammad and Jouja, to subject him to discrimination based on his race and national origin by posting the IG Posts at issue, which he alleges were defamatory and filled with false accusations, and that this discrimination was carried out “in the administration of CAIR Foundation’s program or activities receiving Federal financial assistance.” The Plaintiff also identifies the specific actions he alleges the Defendants took in furtherance of the conspiracy, including the statements Mohammad made that Jouja is allegedly responsible for as president of Emory SJP. At this early stage, these allegations satisfy the elements of a § 1985(3) claim predicated on a Title VI violation.
Whether this claim can withstand summary judgment is a question for another day. Accordingly, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to this argument.
In the process, the court also held that plaintiff had adequately alleged the “protected class” element of § 1985(3), by alleging that he was targeted for his national origin:
The Defendants next argue that the Plaintiff unfairly conflates anti-Zionism with antisemitism in order to “place an entire area of First Amendment-protected political, legal and ethical discussion off limits.” … The Defendants essentially argue that because Zionism is (in their view) solely a political philosophy, the Plaintiff has actually alleged that their actions were not truly motivated by his Jewish identity but instead by their opposition to Zionism and serving in the IDF. But taking that view would require the Court to construe the Plaintiff’s allegations narrowly and in their favor, which it cannot do at this stage.
What the Plaintiff actually alleges, if construed in his favor—and what the Court must accept as true at this stage—is that his military service resulted from a “sense of duty to serve the Jewish homeland, which is integral to his racial identity as a Jew” [“racial” is here used in the historical sense that included what we would now call “ethnicity,” consistent with the Court’s caselaw on § 1985 and related statutes -EV] and that his association with Zionism is also “an integral part of Jewish identity for a very significant number of Jews.” In essence, the Plaintiff alleges that his military service and association with Zionism are markers of his own personal Jewish identity, and that his Jewish heritage as an Israeli national is a protected class.
Critical to this interpretation is the Plaintiff’s allegations that his IDF service was tied to the duty he felt based on his nationality and the significance of Zionism in Jewish culture. These allegations suffice at this stage to demonstrate that a discriminatory animus based on a protected class—the Plaintiff’s national origin—motivated the Defendants’ actions, not mere political differences.
And the court concluded that plaintiff had adequately alleged that defendants’ speech fell within the First Amendment exception for defamation. It concluded that plaintiff had adequately alleged that he wasn’t a limited purpose public figure, despite his op-ed. And the court concluded that plaintiff had adequately alleged that the statements about him contained false factual assertions:
Plaintiff asserts that parts of Mohammad’s statement in the Democracy Now! interview are demonstrably false, including her statements that the Plaintiff “aid[ed and abett[ed] a genocide” and “aid[ed] and abett[ed] the destruction of the healthcare system in Gaza.” Regardless of whether these statements express political opinion, the statements could reasonably “imply defamatory facts about the plaintiff that are capable of being proved false” when the facts are construed in the Plaintiff’s favor[.] This is because Mohammad’s statements—that the Plaintiff alleges Jouja is responsible for reposting as president of Emory SJP, along with supportive commentary—imply that the Plaintiff actively participated in combat operations during his service in the IDF, but the Plaintiff pled that he served
solely in his capacity as a physician, providing medical care to wounded soldiers. His involvement in combat was limited to situations in which his unit came under direct attack … Mohammad had no factual basis to claim that Plaintiff participated in or approved the bombing of hospitals in Gaza [or] celebrated the killing of Palestinians.
The Court agrees with the Defendants’ position that characterizing the Israel-Hamas war as a genocide is likely an inactionable opinion because it reflects a “subjective assessment, as to which reasonable minds could differ, [and which] cannot be proved false.” But the statements at issue here go further and allege personal combat participation in the alleged genocide—a fact which the Plaintiff could prove at a later stage is false. At this stage, his allegations about his role are enough to satisfy the “false and defamatory statement” element of his defamation per se claim and the falsity element of his false light claim.
The same is true of part of Mohammad’s statement during the press conference, in which she stated that
[h]aving a physician faculty member who participated in a military convicted of committing genocide against Palestinians makes me feel unsafe. It makes black and brown medical students feel unsafe. It makes black and brown and indigenous patients feel unsafe. I cannot learn from a physician who might have fired one of the 355 bullets that landed in 6 year old Hind Rajab’s body. Or who might have helped make the decision to bomb one of the hospitals in Gaza … a doctor who cannot see Palestinians as human beings will return to Atlanta to offer the same disposability to black and brown patients at home.
There are parts of the statement that express Mohammad’s opinion, such as the part that the Plaintiff’s military service makes her, and “black and brown medical students,” feel unsafe. This is a subjective assessment that cannot be proved false, so this part of the statement is not actionable. But the part of the statement that suggests the Plaintiff might have been involved in combat decisions or actions and accuses him of not “see[ing] Palestinians as human beings” and offering “the same disposability to black and brown patients” at Emory certainly implies that the Plaintiff engaged in combat operations while serving in the IDF and that patients of certain races are therefore not safe in his care.
The same is true of the statement in Emory SJP’s March 28, 2025 collaborative IG Post that described the Plaintiff as “a physician with military combat experience against Palestinians.” The Plaintiff has alleged counter-facts that, if accepted as true, prove these portions of the statements false, so the Plaintiff states a claim as to these portions of the press conference statement and the March 28 Emory SJP IG Post.
For these reasons, the Court will dismiss the portion of the Plaintiff’s defamation and false light claims predicated on the opinion portions of the statements identified above. The Court will deny the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to the remainder of their First Amendment and opinion-based arguments….
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